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 
Abstract— In both avionic and automotive systems, it might 
become very costly and/or restricting the functional performance, 
to prove functions safe in all operational conditions and for 100% 
of the mission time. This is especially true if the quality of sensor 
data and of communication data may vary very much. One way 
to solve this trade-off paradox is to leave part of the safety 
assessment from design-time to run-time. This paper proposes a 
general architectural pattern for this, and also how to instantiate 
this pattern in Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) for the 
avionic domain, and in AUTOSAR for the automotive domain. 
The solutions imply some extensions of ARINC 653 and of 
AUTOSAR respectively, but they are not in conflict with the 
existing concepts. The proposed solutions are also fully in-line 
what is prescribed by the standards for functional safety of the 
two domains. 
 
Index Terms—Safety Integrity, IMA, AUTOSAR,  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n both the industry fields of Avionics and of Automotive, 
there has been established a norm of having integrated, 
rather than federated, Electrical/Electronic (E/E) architectures. 
In the avionic field this is called Integrated Modular Avionics 
(IMA) [6] and is today often following the ARINC 653 
specifications [7], and in the automotive field it is the 
AUTOSAR specifications constituting the state-of-practice. 
One advantage with an integrated architecture is that it is 
possible to increase the number of vehicle functions and still 
decrease the number of computing nodes, often called LRUs 
(Line Replaceable Units) or ECUs (Electronic Control Units). 
Different functions may be realized by architectural elements 
(sensors, actuators, computing components, communication 
components, etc.) that may be shared among several functions. 
However, in the transition from a federated to an integrated 
pattern, the way to ensure functional safety has become more 
complex. Instead of directly transfer the safety arguing 
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responsibility to a node supplier, the integrated pattern calls 
for a component-based approach in both the design itself and 
in the safety case generation. Furthermore, achieving 
functional safety is a goal that often is in conflict with high 
performance and low cost. 
In this paper we outline an architectural pattern that is 
possible to apply for both IMA and AUTOSAR, and that helps 
to resolve the paradox of getting functional safety together 
with low cost and high functional performance.  
II. ARGUING SAFETY 
The problem how to prove that a solution is functionally 
safe, is defined specifically by applicable standards in each 
domain. For road vehicles, functional safety is defined by ISO 
26262 [10], and the instruction how to apply component-based 
safety arguing is so far limited to what is stated as Safety 
Element out of Context (SEooC) in the informative part 10 of 
the standard. For the avionic domain there are several 
applicable standards. The IMA perspective is found in 
RTCA/D0-297: “Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) 
Development Guidance and Certification Considerations”. 
This standard refers to other standards such as SAE 
International's Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4754 
on “Certification Considerations for Highly-Integrated or 
Complex Aircraft Systems”, and SAE ARP 4761 on 
“Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety 
Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and 
Equipment”. These in turn refer to RTCA/DO-178: “Software 
Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification”.  
On a high level, one can say that arguing safety is similar in 
the two domains. They both rely on a Hazard Analysis & and 
Risk Assessment (HARA) of the vehicle functions, resulting 
in required risk reduction by means of safety integrity levels 
for the realizing architectural components. In the automotive 
domain the safety integrity levels are called Automotive 
Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) [10], and in the avionic domain 
they are called Development Assurance Level (DAL) [12]. 
The default alternative is to use a fault avoidance 
argumentation based on the fact that all used components, 
each conform to the required safety integrity level. This can be 
combined with a fault-tolerance argumentation based on 
introducing redundancy and hence lower the required integrity 
level of the components. To integrate components having 
different integrity levels on the same platform, freedom of 
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interference has to be shown. This is a major concern in 
RTCA/DO-297.   
III. DETERMINE THE REQUIRED RISK REDUCTION (SAFETY 
INTEGRITY LEVEL SAFETY) 
In both domains, the determination of safety integrity level 
is based on a severity classification of the possible failures of 
the vehicle function under consideration. In the avionic 
domain this directly leads to one of the Development 
Assurance Levels in the interval between A (required by a 
catastrophic failure) and E (when there is no safety effect 
required). In the automotive domain the severity classification 
of the vehicle function has to be evaluated together with 
assumptions on how often such a failure is critical among the 
driving scenarios, and with an assumption how well the driver 
can compensate for the failure. These three factors together, 
lead to an Automotive Safety Integrity Level in the range 
between ASIL D (highest requirement on risk reduction) and 
QM (no requirement on risk reduction). 
In both domains, a high requirement on risk reduction 
implies a high safety integrity level requirement (formulated 
by DAL or by ASIL) on the used components. It is needed to 
show that the vehicle and its components fulfill all 
requirements on safety integrity levels. This assessment is 
completely done in design-time, and shows that the vehicle 
always is functional safe with respect to the complete scope of 
the functions considered in the Hazard Analysis. 
IV. EXTENDING THE ARCHITECTURAL PATTERN 
Building vehicles where the complete scope of all functions 
are proven safe in all operational conditions and for 100% of 
the mission time, might become very costly and/or restricting 
the functional performance. One way to solve this trade-off 
paradox is to leave part of the safety assessment from design-
time to run-time. By letting the architecture itself in run-time 
measure the provided safety integrity levels from the 
components, it can enable adjustment of the different 
functions such that their required safety integrity levels are 
met. Let each vehicle function have a number of predefined 
levels of performance (levels of service), for which the 
resulting hazard analyses are different. If we then in run-time 
can measure for which levels of service/performance the 
safety integrity requirements are fulfilled, the vehicle can be 
proven safe once we can guarantee that all functions always 
are forced to a level of service/performance that is considered 
safe. What we need for this is an architectural pattern enabling 
the complete measuring of the safety integrity levels of the 
architectural elements, and a way to ensure that all functions 
operates on a level of service/performance that can be proven 
safe.  
This paper shows the general architectural pattern, and also 
outlines how it can be instantiated into the state-of-practice in 
the integrated architecture of the domains of automotive 
(AUTOSAR) and of avionics (IMA realized by ARINC 653), 
respectively. 
A. Design-Time vs. Run-Time 
Even if the strategy proposed in this paper is that there is a 
run-time check of what safety integrity levels that are met in 
order to match with the appropriate performance level, all 
possible results have to be assessed in design-time. In both the 
avionic and the automotive domain, a complete functional 
assessment has to be done in design-time according to the 
respective reference life-cycles. The solution presented in this 
paper is fully aligned with this. When we say that we leave 
part of the safety assessment to run-time, this implies that all 
the possible alternatives for performance levels and also the 
mechanisms to determine the right levels, all are assessed in 
design time. 
 
B. Relation to functional safety standards of today 
In both DO178 and in ISO26262, there is a concept of 
integrity levels (DAL / ASIL), to allocate requirements on the 
reference life cycle in order to argue sufficiently absence of 
systematic design faults. When we suggest having several 
levels of performance implying different required safety 
integrity levels on the output of some components, this implies 
that the DAL/ASIL applicable for the design of each 
component will be the highest safety integrity level among the 
possible ones. The concept of adjusting the levels of 
performance to the run-time available safety integrity levels is 
hence not primarily applicable to handle systematic design 
faults, but to take care of the varying quality of data due to the 
varying amount of redundancy sources and of varying quality 
of sensors and communication links.  
Especially from the software design point of view, we 
assume that what is prescribed as needed to argue for the 
highest applicable safety integrity level, still must be 
implemented as well in the application components as in the 
platform software (ARINC653/AUTOSAR). This requirement 
of design according to the highest safety integrity level is of 
course applicable to the redundancy mechanisms checking the 
quality of data, and to the platform mechanisms determining 
the appropriate level of service/performance. This is further 
elaborated in the section below: A general pattern. 
The consequence of having a number of different levels of 
performance is that the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 
has to be done completely for each considered level. The 
stages prescribed in ARP4754 or ISO26262 part 3 thus have to 
be done not only for the functions, but for each level of 
performance for each function. Furthermore, each transition 
between two levels of performance has to be considered, as 
elaborated below in the section: Scalability and timing. 
Regarding the safety standards applicable today in the 
domains of avionic and automotive, we conclude that they are 
fully in-line with both the concept of several levels of 
performance, and with the architectural pattern we outline in 
this paper.  
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C. Relation to existing patterns for mixed criticality 
Mixed criticality [5] is the concept of allowing applications 
with different levels of criticality (safety integrity) to co-exist 
on the same system. In both ARINC 653 and in AUTOSAR 
there are mechanisms to deal with this problem. The assumed 
problem to deal with is to guarantee freedom of interference 
between application components designed to different levels 
of safety integrity. The solutions in both ARINC 653 and in 
AUTOSAR are to provide mechanisms for handling time and 
space partitioning.  
However, when introducing several levels of performance, 
each implying different requirements on safety integrity levels 
of the output of some components, this is not the classical 
problem of mixed criticality. Even if we have a mixture of 
different levels of safety integrity among the components co-
existing on the same platform, their requirements on the safety 
integrity of the absence of systematic design faults are all on 
the same level (the highest among alternatives). Hence we do 
not need to prove freedom of interference between 
components designed according to different DAL or ASIL, 
because that is not the case. All components used for a certain 
function are designed according to the safety integrity level 
that is applicable for the highest level of performance. 
The mechanisms for enabling time and space partitioning 
are of course still important when arguing safety, even in our 
proposed pattern, but they are not affected by the introduction 
of several levels of performance with different safety integrity 
level requirements on some data signals. 
 
D. Scalability and timing 
Given the fundamental idea of leaving part of the safety 
assessment for the run-time, raises potential issues of 
scalability and timing.  
Scalability issues stem from the fact that some system 
resources will be required for performing the run-time safety 
assessment. For instance, it will be necessary to collect 
measurements of available integrity levels, and it will be 
necessary to store information (defined in design time) 
concerning the safety integrity requirements for each level of 
service. This has essentially practical implications (availability 
of enough memory and computing power), which could limit 
the applicability of the approach. Fortunately, the effective 
requirements grow linearly with the number of components 
for which integrity has to be assessed, which is also limited by 
the available resources. In fact, the additional resources 
required for assessing safety in run-time are necessarily a very 
small fraction of the resources required by the components 
itself.  
Timing issues are more important in this context because it 
is necessary to argue about functional safety, for which they 
have to be considered. As mentioned before, in design time it 
is necessary to assess, for each function, that it will perform 
safe in each possible performance level. But this is not 
enough. Given that, for each function, there will be run-time 
changes of the performance level, the analysis must take into 
account the time that it takes to complete these changes. For 
instance, if in run-time it is detected that some component is 
not performing with the required integrity level, then it will be 
necessary to change the performance level of all the functions 
that are affected by this integrity degradation, and this has to 
be done within some limited amount of time. Otherwise, the 
functions would continue to perform in some inadequate level 
for an uncertain amount of time, clearly outside the safety 
analysis performed in design time. 
The general pattern must hence provide the means to 
address these timeliness requirements. In addition, it is 
necessary to discuss the implications of the (bounded) amount 
of time that is necessary to change the performance level of 
some function. A sufficient condition for ensuring timely 
detection of changes in the safety integrity levels, and 
consequent timely change of performance level, is that it is 
possible to perform a timing analysis of all the involved 
system components, deriving upper execution bounds. In 
particular, this includes the component responsible for 
performing the safety assessment, which is always involved in 
the process. If some function has to be performed with some 
minimal performance level, then it must also be possible to 
perform such timing analysis for all the implied components. 
The time that will be necessary to switch among different 
performance levels will typically be close the execution 
periods of the system components.  In comparison with the 
typical latency of physical processes (such as braking, 
deviating from an obstacle, etc), these periods are much 
smaller. This means that the safety analysis will be, for the 
relevant part, still valid. In any case, the time that it takes to 
perform a change in the performance level can also be 
considered in the design of the functions, so that this is 
accounted in safety margins. 
V. A GENERAL PATTERN 
Each vehicle function is realized by a set of interconnected 
sensors, actuators and software components. The software 
components have an interface making them possible to be 
allocated on any platform node. The outputs of every sensor, 
and of every software component, are duplets consisting of 
both the nominal output and of an attribute stating the 
estimation of the corresponding safety integrity level. All 
redundancy mechanisms in the architecture such as: sensor 
fusion, voting, consistency checking, etc., are evaluating the 
consistency of the nominal values and calculates a resulting 
determination of the safety integrity level value. All safety 
integrity level values of a computing node are checked by a 
safety manager that is part of the platform specification. The 
safety manager compares in run-time that each provided safety 
integrity level of every output value, is high enough for the 
current scope of vehicle functions. If some of the provided 
safety integrity levels are too low, the safety manager tells the 
application mode managers to change to a level where the 
respective functions are considered safe. If all provided safety 
integrity levels are high enough for a higher level of 
service/performance than the actual for some functions, the 
safety manager tells the application mode managers to change 
accordingly. 
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Fig. 1.  The figure of a general architecture pattern. Each 
software component communicates via ports with signals. 
Each signal is a duplet with a nominal value (V) and a safety 
integrity level attribute (I). The safety manager checks all 
safety integrity level values, and decides what function modes 
that are safe. The mode manager tells each software 
component about the mode decisions 
 
A. Derivation of the Safety Integrity Attributes 
As argued before, the extension of safety assessment from 
design-time to run-time allows for relaxing overly restrictive 
assumptions about the required integrity status of the overall 
complex control systems. However, it requires the continuous 
monitoring and evaluation of the integrity attribute during run-
time. Fig.1 shows that for every signal generated by a 
component, there is a complementary output that provides an 
integrity level attribute. Roughly, this attribute represents a 
measure for the integrity of the respective signal produced by 
a component.  When checking against allocated safety 
requirements, this estimation needs to be done against the 
defined discrete levels of the applicable standard. For both the 
standards we have five levels to consider. However, when 
deriving the safety integrity attributes we may use more fine-
grained estimations.   In this paper we call such a more fine-
grained value, the Validity of a signal. 
 
The assumed structure of a complex component comprises 
the acquisition and computational components from a sensor 
that captures a real-world entity to the component that outputs 
an application relevant data element (signal). The architectural 
element outputs the nominal signal (V) together with an 
integrity attribute (I) that enables the safety assessment at run 
time.  To generate the integrity attribute, the component needs 
a self-assessment mechanism. Further, a nominal value 
affected by a failure may pass a filter to mitigate or mask the 
effect. We therefore distinguish between a detection 
mechanism and a filter mechanism. The checking mechanism 
detects a failure without affecting the respective signal. It 
modifies the integrity attribute only. The filter is a general 
abstraction of a component that mitigates or eliminates the 
effect of a failure. Typically, detectors and filters are 
integrated in a fault-tolerance mechanism. We separate the 
aspects of awareness and treatment because these are different 
concerns and the separation allows for more freedom of 
design.  e.g. omitting a filter completely in the component for 
handling the failure in a subsequent stage. Fig. 2 depicts this 
general structure of such an element. 
The run-time assessment mechanisms are based on the 
specification and quantification of design-time assumptions. 
During design-time an engineer has to answer questions like 
"which failure types are affecting the components and what is 
their impact?", "How are these failures detected and how good 
the detection mechanisms need to be?" and " How is the data 
conditioned and filtered to compensate the effects of 
failures?".  Based on these assumptions the engineer adjusts 
the quality of the component's outgoing data at run-time to the 
integrity requirements. In our approach, these engineering 
assumptions are quantified to allow a comprehensible 
assessment. Assumptions are quantified in a failure model, a 
quantification of the detection capabilities and the filter 
characteristics. This is particularly needed when such a 
component is used in a larger setting or will be reused in 
another design. As an example we examine a typical 
component where the input data is provided by a sensor.  
 
We distinguish two flows of information in Fig.3. The 
lower part generates the nominal data output while the upper 
part is devoted to the calculation of the integrity attribute. In 
this paper we will focus on the definition and transformation 
of the parameters defining the integrity attribute. 
 
We are considering a data centric failure model [2] which 
specifies failures in terms of how they affect the data e.g. 
according to an anticipated signal behaviour. The starting 
point is the identification of relevant sensor failures. Sensors 
deliver continuous values that may be affected by e.g. noise, 
offsets, spikes and outliers. A detailed discussion about sensor 
failure modes is given in [3]. An assessment vector quantifies 
for each failure type a number that characterizes the 
anticipated severity and the occurrence probability of this 
failure. This is comparable to a risk priority number in the 
FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) scheme [4]. 
Different from FMEA, we provide a scheme that allows 
combining multiple failure types and using this for run time 
assessment, while FMEA maps multiple failure types to the 
static worst case risk priority number.  
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For describing the detector and filter characteristics we 
provide transformation matrices that modify the assessment 
vector for the respective stages. In case of a detector, the 
matrix specifies the ratio of correctly detected failures versus 
the wrongly and not detected failures. This statically sets the 
upper and lower bounds for the integrity attribute and modifies 
the assessment vector accordingly. The filter matrix defines 
the impact that the filter may have on the signal, i.e. the degree 
of suppressing a faulty signal. A filter that operates as a failure 
masking mechanism will raise the lower bound for the validity 
because it eliminates faulty values. Applied to the assessment 
vector it modifies the respective elements related to the 
affected failure types.  The assessment vector finally holds for 
each failure type an element that describes which effect this 
specific failure will have on the final integrity attribute. It 
should be noted that this number includes the capabilities of 
the detector and filter with respect to the particular failure. The 
integration stage collapses the vector representation to a single 
scalar integrity attribute. This stage uses a selection vector that 
holds weights for each failure type and therefore allows a 
further restriction to relevant failure types. E.g. for long term 
navigation, single outliers of a localization sensor may not be 
as relevant as a constant offset failure. However, outliers may 
have a high impact on the validity because of their amplitude. 
Thus, an outlier would decrease the integrity attribute to an 
inacceptable low level although it would not be relevant. 
Another application may need a high validity of differential 
positions. Here, constant offsets would not play a major role. 
The selection vector can adjust these different application 
needs. In the end, we obtain what we call the system validity, 
a measure of how good the detection and filter mechanisms 
will deal with failures. 
  
So far, all the information that is captured in the assessment 
vector, the transformation matrices and the selection vector is 
available at design time and quantifies of the engineering 
assumptions about relevant failure types, their impact, the 
quality of the detection mechanism and the power of the filter 
in suppressing the effect of failures.  
 
In the conventional approach, the outcome of this analysis 
would be compared to a required integrity and in the case of a 
match, the design would be accepted. This implies that the 
assumptions about the failures, the detection and filter 
capabilities are worst-case assumptions and require a 
substantial amount of resources to keep the bounds. If the 
design does not fulfill the static worst-case requirements, the 
design needs to be changed. This may require substantial 
redundant resources or more expensive components even 
though the actual operation would not even come close to the 
worst-case bounds in by far the most cases. In the proposed 
architectural pattern, the numerical representation of the 
integrity is exploited to detect at run time whether the 
component will meet the integrity requirements. If the 
dynamically derived integrity attribute falls below a certain 
threshold, we are able provide the countermeasures on a 
higher level, i.e. on the level of provided services that may 
need to be degraded (see also the example in the next section 
B).  
At run time, the detector will provide a result for each 
failure that it is able to detect. These outcomes are stored in a 
vector with the same dimension as the assessment vector. The 
elements of the assessment vector are applied as weights to 
this vector to form the validity vector. The validity vector 
represents the actual estimated validity as a result of the 
detector stage. It is transferred to the filter stage where a 
similar calculation is performed. The final validity vector 
holds a dynamic estimate about the validity of the generated 
nominal data item with respect to each failure type.  Finally, 
this vector is converted into a single scalar number which 
represents the integrity attribute. The details of the assignment 
of values and the operations defined by the failure algebra are 
beyond the scope of this paper. They are provided in [5].  
 
B. Relating the validity estimation to the Integrity Attributes 
In a safety-critical system, the hazard analysis will result in a 
set of functional failures that should not occur. In the coming 
phases these restrictions are broken down to what failures 
should not occur for the elements in the chosen architecture. 
Still, all these failures are restricted by the safety integrity 
level attributes telling how sure one have to be that these 
failures will not occur. The question is how sure we can be at 
run-time about the absence of these failures, if we cannot 
guarantee at design-time that this will always hold. We now 
will show, how the dynamic validity can be exploited to 
quantify these requirements. Let us first use a simple data 
centric model of failure. Failures may be specified in terms of 
its amplitude, e.g. the error exceeds ±5% of the true value or 
in duration e.g. that they will not last for more than 10ms.  
According to the goal of our architectural pattern, we enable 
the dynamic change of the Level of Service (LoS) to maintain 
a required level of safety.  For the information generated by a 
component that contributes to a function we need specifying  
Fig. 2.  Estimating the signal quality by a checking mechanism. 
 
Fig. 3.  Computational chain for a sensor processing component. 
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different levels of confidence that the data value is within 
certain bounds.  Fig. 4 illustrates this. 
 
 
 
a.) A complex component has to meet several safety 
requirements 
 
 
 
b.) Example of defining 4 thresholds for different safety 
integrity levels in the automotive and avionics terminology 
 
Fig. 4 Example of a complex component used in applications 
running in multiple integrity levels 
 
The complex component provides a nominal output that is 
subject of multiple safety requirements ranging from the 
highest ASIL D to QM. Integrity attributes are provided at 
separate outputs. They are represented as an integrity attribute 
vector that holds for each failure the confidence that it does 
not exceed the predefined bounds. Considering the thresholds 
in Fig. 4b, we model failure classes that e.g. do not deviate 
more than ±2%, ±5%, ±10%, ±20% and ±30% from the true 
value for ASIL D, C, B, A, and QM respectively. The integrity 
attribute vector holds the respective confidence values that 
these values are indeed within the specified bounds. If the 
confidence drops below a certain value in the most demanding 
safety class, this confidence value may well be within the 
bounds of a lower one. This would be reflected by the 
integrity attribute of the respective failure class. In this case, 
that the integrity attribute is too low, it may be necessary to 
switch to another level of service. 
 
The notion of validity that was introduced before can be 
mapped to this more safety centric perspective. Given that the 
requirements of the safety integrity level concerning the error 
of the nominal value are specified, the validity calculus allows 
defining the failure characteristics through the computational 
chain. The failure model will be adapted to the thresholds of 
the amplitudes. Consider that the failure may not exceed  ±2% 
of the true value and we want to be sure about this at a certain 
confidence level. This affects the choice of the sensor, the 
detector and the filter. The validity calculus allows to quantify 
these effects. At the sensor, an assessment vector represents 
the sensor characteristics for each failure type in terms of 
amplitude and of occurrence probability. If the requirements 
specify a very low margin on the amplitude of failure, noise, 
small offsets and drift have to be considered. We have to 
consult the failure model to see which failures are effective in 
such tight bounds. This will be analysed statically for each 
deviation addressed in the example above. In the end, we will 
have the design-time assurance that at run-time, under all 
anticipated conditions, the output of the component will have 
the integrity level indicated in the respective integrity attribute 
vector. If the safety requirements are very high, as it is e.g. 
required for ASIL D, the quality of the sensor and the 
mechanisms to mask a failure to always be within the bounds 
must be very high. I.e. we may need massive redundancy of 
expensive components. The problem is, that even a less 
expensive sensor will deliver results within tight bounds most 
of the time with sufficient probability. Detection and filters 
will detect or suppress failures sufficiently most of the time 
with sufficient probability. Thus the probability of a failure at 
run time will meet the ASIL D requirements most of the time 
but violations may happen. Conventional systems usually do 
not use the mechanisms to assess the integrity level at run-
time. Instead they guarantee by design time analysis that such 
violations will never happen.  
 
In contrast, our system explores the safety-cost-performance 
trade-off by offering multiple levels of service. Without 
sacrificing safety, we may run a function with a lower 
integrity attribute at a lower level of service. Prerequisite for 
this is the run-time assessment. The run-time integrity attribute 
output will give us, for each of the bounds specified in the 
example above, the confidence that the actual nominal value 
really is within the respective bounds. Thus, the design-time 
analysis is the basis to derive the run time values. The quality 
of detection and filter mechanisms are included in this 
assessment. A detector, for example, is characterized by the 
probability to deliver false {positives, negatives} and true 
{positives, negatives}. It is clear that for guaranteeing a very 
high confidence in the checked data, these values must be 
adequate. An ideal detector with no false positives and 
negatives will detect each failure correctly and therefore will 
transform the integrity attribute of a nominal value to "0" in 
case of a failure detected and "1" if no failure is detected. Real 
detectors, of course, will have weaker bounds. For a filter we 
similarly specify the ability to mask a failure. Details of these 
calculations are presented in [5]. As a consequence of the 
quantitative representation of engineering assumptions and the 
tight interplay between design time assurance and run time 
assessment, we can adjust the needed confidence according to 
the needs of the safety requirements. If such a dynamic value, 
represented in the integrity attribute, is not sufficient for a 
function running in a certain assurance level we have to switch 
to a lower level of service. 
VI. INSTANTIATION IN AUTOSAR 
AUTOSAR is a de facto standard in the automotive domain 
enabling an integrated architecture. It defines how to specify 
application software components (SWC) that are reallocatable. 
All software component inputs and outputs are as data 
elements through ports. Our suggested pattern implies that 
each data element should consist of a duplet: the existing 
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nominal data element, complemented by an ASIL attribute. It 
is the responsibility of each SWC to compute the 
corresponding ASIL values. If there is no redundancy 
implemented, this means that the input ASIL values are 
inherited for the output values. Otherwise, ASIL 
decomposition is applied according to the algebra as defined 
in the ISO26262 standard. We furthermore propose a new 
basic software module (BSW): Safety Manager. This is in line 
with existing managers among the BSWs today. This new 
safety manager will compare the computed ASIL value of 
each signal with the required ones, that are stored for each 
function level of performance/service. In AUTOSAR today, 
all data elements are already connected to the run-time 
environment (RTE), constituting the interface for the BSW. 
Our pattern hence implies that the RTE will be extended with 
the requirement to connect all ASIL values to the Safety 
Manager.  
The concept of modes is on three hierarchical levels in 
AUTOSAR: Vehicle Modes, Application Modes and BSW 
Modes, see Fig. 5. It’s only the BSW modes that are 
standardized in the AUTOSAR set of specifications. It is 
assumed that different applications have implemented modes 
in their definitions. The control of these modes is within the 
application implementation, i.e. it is implemented by 
application software components (not in the platform). On an 
even higher level than application modes, there is Vehicles 
modes, which are global for the entire vehicle. As seen in the 
Fig. 5 there might be influences between modes on all these 
levels. 
 
 
Fig. 5 How the different kinds of modes in AUTOSAR may 
influence each other. 
 
We assume that the existing concept of application modes 
can be used for forcing all applicable SWCs to a mode 
corresponding to the level of service/performance as 
considered the highest and still safe by the Safety Manager. 
This is one extra connection between a SWC and the RTE, but 
it is in-line with the existing pattern and hence considered as 
an attractive extension of AUTOSAR. 
 As we don’t consider checking spatial and temporal 
interference between SWCs, the normal BSW mode managers 
as specified by the AUTOSAR standards such as: ECU State 
Manager, BSW Mode Manager, Communication Manager and 
Watchdog Manager are not of importance here. The 
application mode managers are implemented as ordinary 
software components and communicate with other software 
components via RTE.  
VII. INSTANTIATION IN IMA 
Currently, in the avionic domain IMA is considered to be 
implemented by means of the ARINC 653 specification [7], 
which determines that applications are functionally separated 
in logical containers, called partitions. One goal of partitioning 
is to ensure the containment of faults in the domain in which 
they occur. Partitioning in logical containers implies non-
interference of applications’ execution in the time domain and 
the usage of separated memory and input/output addressing 
spaces [8]. 
 Application software components are hosted in partitions. 
All software components inputs and outputs are as data 
elements, using the inter-partition communication services 
provided by the ARINC 653 Application Executive (APEX) 
application programming interface primitives. In particular, 
we propose to take advantage of the sampling ports services to 
extend the software component port values with a DAL 
attribute, as illustrated in Fig. 6.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 Instantiation in IMA/ARINC 653 platforms 
 
 The Safety Manager will also be hosted in a partition and it 
will monitor the DAL attributes of all software component 
signals [9]. This can be easily achieved by platform 
configuration, allowing inter-partition communication services 
to deliver the components’ nominal output and DAL duplets 
both to the destination components and to the Safety Manager, 
which for will read the DAL attribute, as illustrated in Fig 6.  
 A similar approach can be followed when the Safety 
Manager needs to change the performance/service level and 
set a new application mode. This action, which may also take 
advantage of inter-partition communication services, is also 
illustrated in Fig. 6. The Safety Manager sets the highest 
possible safe level of service/performance and the components 
change to the corresponding mode. 
Vehicle Modes 
BSW Modes 
Application Modes 
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 With this approach the instantiation of the general 
architecture pattern in IMA/ARINC 653 platforms does not 
require any modification or extension of the platform itself; 
only a platform configuration action is needed. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This paper summarizes how to apply a new architectural 
pattern as an extension to existing state-of-practice in the 
domains of avionics (IMA) and of automotive (AUTOSAR). 
The pattern is applicable to solve the problem when it is hard 
to show in design-time that a high safety integrity is met under 
all circumstances and for 100% of the mission. By introducing 
different levels of service/performance each having different 
implications on needed safety integrity, high performance 
most of the time can be combined with guaranteed functional 
safety all of the time.  
The pattern constitutes that every signal value that is the 
candidate for different requirements on safety integrity levels, 
should be evaluated by a redundancy mechanism capable to 
calculate a run-time estimation of the actual provided safety 
integrity level. 
Furthermore, the pattern implies the introduction of a Safety 
manager taking care of checking the safety integrity level 
attribute of every system signal. The safety manager compares 
during run-time all currently provided safety integrity levels 
with those derived from the break-down of the hazard analyses 
of the different levels of performance/service of the vehicle 
functions. As a result of the comparison, the safety manager 
enforces all functions to operate in the highest 
performance/service level that is still safe, by means of 
application mode managers. 
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